

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS
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June 10, 2004

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations.

From: Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst.

Subject: Briefing memorandum for the hearing *Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds*,
scheduled for Tuesday, June 15, 2004 at 2:00 p.m., room 2247 Rayburn
House Office Building in Washington, D.C.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The hearing will examine assumptions and significant policy decisions contributing to changes in Iraqi confidence and cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority.

HEARING ISSUES

- 1. What policy decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority contributed to changes in Iraqi confidence and cooperation?**
- 2. What steps does the United States need to take to regain the confidence and cooperation of the Iraqi people?**

BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2004, the Subcommittee held a hearing, *Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*. Public diplomacy in that region today has been focused on persuading Iraqis and their neighbors that the United States is there as liberator, not occupier. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)¹ is accelerating efforts to build United States and indigenous media capacity to balance the current one-sided public discourse in the Arab world.² However, public diplomacy alone will not regain the confidence and cooperation of the Iraqi people.³

On June 30, 2004, the CPA will transfer power to the Iraq interim government. The United States and its Coalition partners are in a similar situation as they have been in other countries—attempting to win the hearts and minds of the people, and provide military security and support to economic and political reform programs

¹ The CPA is the administrative body exercising powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transition.

² Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: the American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press).

³ US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform Hearing, *Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*, February 10, 2004, found at <http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR>.

for an independent and sovereign nation.⁴ Winning the confidence and cooperation of Iraqis will be challenging, especially since some of the assumptions made about Iraq were faulty and some policy decisions were considered controversial and hindered rather than helped stabilize Iraq.

A look back at some of the assumptions and policy decisions made over the past year will assist in determining what corrective action needs to be taken to regain the confidence and cooperation (hearts and minds) of the Iraqi people, assist in our public diplomacy message, and help chart the course for future efforts in Iraq.

Understanding Iraq—Tribes, Peoples, Religions and Customs

At least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the country's 150 tribes. Iraq's society is very feudalistic (one dominant person or group exercising control over others), with most of the population identifying him/herself with one tribe. Tribes have always been an important part of Iraqi society. Even those Iraqi citizens without a tribal background often turn to neighborhood sheikhs for representation or assistance with the government. **(Attachment 1)**

Iraqis do not belong to the kind of civic professional groups that are so common in America, the pillars of civil society that observers since Alex de Tocqueville⁵ have been crediting for the promotion of democracy. Sheik Yousef Sayel, the patriarch in charge of a clan on the Tigris River south of Baghdad describes the importance of tribal relations in Iraq. Sheik Yousef said Iraqis discourage children from participating in any outside groups because they believe they have a dynasty to preserve. "I told my children not to participate in any outside groups or clubs," Sheik Yousif said. "We don't want distractions. We have a dynasty to preserve." To make his point, he told his sons to unroll the family tree, a scroll 70 feet long with lots of cousins intertwined in the branches describing the family and tribal relationships. **(Attachment 2)**

Individuals are protected by their tribes, yet at the same time are limited by the tribe. For example, women belong to the family and do not have many rights when

⁴ Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds*. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press).

⁵ An aristocratic Frenchman who came to the US in 1831 and wrote *Democracy in America*, a two-volume study of the American people and their political institutions.

it comes to choosing their own future. Deciding whether to work or not, choosing a profession, choosing their spouses is not in their hands. What is decisive is the family's approval. If one defects from the existing social structure, it means that one is immoral. Since immorality would ruin the honor of the family, the respective family member should be punished. **(Attachment 2)**

While family and tribalism are extremely important in understanding Iraq society, the peoples and religions of the country also play an important role. Iraq has long been a religious, ethnic and ideological mosaic difficult to rule. King Faisal, the first monarch in Iraq's modern era, wrote in his memoirs shortly before his death in 1937, "Regrettably, I can say there is no Iraqi people yet, but only deluded human groups void of any national idea," **(Attachment 3)**

There are two dominant groups of people in Iraq: Arabs, which make up 70% of the population, and Kurds comprising 25% of the population. The recent decades have seen serious problems in the relationship between the Iraqi Arab majority and the Kurdish minority. The Kurds have fought against Iraqi Arabs for their own independence, have an identity of their own, and speak their own language—Kurdish. However, tensions between various Kurdish factions made it possible for Iraq to maintain control over the Kurdish North. **(Web Resource 1)**

According to estimates, approximately 97 percent of the population of 22-28 million people in Iraq are Muslim.⁶ Shi'a Muslims are predominantly Arab, but also consist of Turkoman, Faili Kurds, and other groups comprising a 60 to 65

⁶ The Arabic term *'islam* means "submission" and itself comes from the term *'aslama*, which means "to surrender, resign oneself." In Islam, the fundamental duty of each member is to submit to Allah (Arabic for "the God") and whatever Allah wants of them. A person who follows Islam is called a Muslim, and this means "one who surrenders to God." Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct of society's members. After Muhammad's death the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time some persons favored Ali, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors)—Umar, who succeeded in A.D.634, and Uthman, who took power in A.D.644 - enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in A.D.656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter. Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, and withdrew in the first great schism to establish the dissident sect, known as the Shi'as, supporting the claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph must be elected, and over the centuries they have represented themselves as the orthodox branch. **(Web Resource 1)**

percent majority of Iraqis. Sunni Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent of the population (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 percent Sunni Arabs, and the remainder are Sunni Turkomen). The remaining approximately 3 percent of the overall population consist of Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, Mandaeans, and a small number of Jews. **(Web Resource 1)**

Shi'a Arabs, although predominantly located in the south, also comprise the majority of the people in Baghdad, and have large communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the center of the country and in the north. **(Web Resource 1)**

On April 16, 2003, before the end of major hostilities, a congressional delegation drove across the border from Kuwait into Iraq and visited residents of Umm Qasar, a port city in the southern region of Iraq. A prominent local resident said to the delegation, “you don’t know us and we don’t know you, we need to understand each other.” The congressional delegation interpreted the Iraqi’s comment to mean the people of the United States do not understand the Iraqi culture and customs, and the Iraqis do not understand the Americans and what US objectives are for Iraq.⁷

For example, arranged marriages to relatives are a common occurrence in Iraq. A recent newspaper article reported that Iqbal Muhammad did not recall her first glimpse of her future husband, because they were both newborns at the time, but she remembers precisely when she knew he was the one. It was the afternoon her uncle walked over from his house next door and proposed that she marry his son Muhammad. She said, “I was a little surprised, but I knew right away it was a wise choice. It is safer to marry a cousin than a stranger.” Her reaction was typical in a country where nearly half of marriages are between first or second cousins, a statistic that is one of the more important and least understood differences between Iraq and America. **(Attachment 2)**

Many of the United States military are learning Iraqi customs on the job. Soldiers have learned that after shaking hands with an Iraqi, it is a custom to press their

⁷ Congressional Delegation Shays, April 14-23, 2003 to Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, and Israel, participants included Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT), Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, and Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst for the Subcommittee.

right hands over their heart. Arabs place their hand on their heart after a handshake to convey sincerity and respect and to show that the greeting comes from the heart. The hand-on-the-heart gesture is beginning to become second nature to many US troops in Iraq. The soldiers have also learned a man never shakes a woman's hand, that the hand on heart is the proper way to greet a woman. **(Attachment 4)**

A July 2003 Brookings Institution Policy Brief by Amatzia Baram, Professor of Middle East History, University of Haifa, Israel does not discount the complexity of the peoples and religions in Iraq, but stresses the importance of family and tribes.

Baram notes that outside of Iraq common wisdom holds that Saddam Hussein's power base in the Sunni Arab community was both monolithic and loyal to his regime and so is likely to prove entirely uncooperative in post-Saddam Iraq. In truth, important elements of Iraqi tribal society harbored grudges toward the defunct regime because they, like many others, were the victims of its atrocities, and so may prove willing to cooperate with the new political system. The support of such tribal groups is particularly important in the countryside, but it may also be helpful in the large towns. Such support could be extremely useful as coalition forces face growing agitation from a few influential radical Shi'a clergy and daily armed attacks coming from Sunni Arab supporters of the Ba'ath regime embittered by the loss of their privileges. **(Attachment 5)**

During a May 18, 2003, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, Senator Paul Sarbanes asked Mr. Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, "...as we look ahead and make our calculations about the path that lies ahead, it seems to me we have to have some sense of what the miscalculations were that have resulted in us confronting the situation we now have in Iraq. So the question I want to put to you...what were the miscalculations?" **(Web Resource 2)**

Armitage: I look at this question, or to answer it, Senator Sarbanes, by saying what I would do differently? And the single thing I would have done differently after the splendid military victory was to more rapidly to bring in the tribal sheiks.

I think that—I'll speak for myself—that the Shia and Sunni and Kurd and Turkmen and a couple of others, and we could deal with

them in that way. It was wrong I think. I think they're a tribal society in a way that I didn't fully appreciate, and I wish that I had been involved much more in bringing the tribal sheiks into things earlier on. I think we'd be a lot farther down the pike now.

(Web Resource 2)

De-Ba'athification of Iraq

On May 16, 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Administrator, signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, disestablishing the Ba'ath Party of Iraq.

Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba'ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Any such persons determined to be full members of the Ba'ath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior ranks of 'Udw (Member) and 'Udw 'Amil (Active Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members. **(Web Resource 3)**

On November 4, 2003, Ambassador Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 7, Delegation of Authority Under De-Ba'athification Order Number 1. This memorandum delegated authority to the Iraqi Governing Council to carry out the de-Baathification of Iraqi society. **(Web Resource 3)**

Many believe Ba'athist party membership was a prerequisite for anyone with ambition under Saddam Hussein's regime. However, Bremer said he was serious about De-Ba'athification in Iraq, and in line with that he ordered the firing of top-ranking police officials, such as Abdul Razak Abbassi, even though some believe police officials like Abbassi had been instrumental in persuading Iraqi policemen to return to work and had won the confidence of his US counterparts.

(Attachment 6)

In the absence of law enforcement, a low-grade anarchy was unleashed. Acts of murder, armed robbery, auto theft and kidnapping took place.

Vigilantes felt free to threaten members of the old regime. Militant Islamists harassed liquor stores and cinemas, and sometimes women for not covering their heads. Anyone who was not a criminal was vulnerable. Some of this low-grade anarchy continues today. **(Attachment 6)**

On April 24, 2004, Ambassador Bremer, on Al-Iraqiya television said, “Many Iraqis have complained to me that the De-Baathification policy has been applied unevenly and unjustly,” Bremer said, calling the complaints “legitimate.” Easing the ban on top members of Saddam Hussein’s former Ba’ath party is an overdue correction of a US mistake, experts and many Iraqis said, blaming the policy for converting thousands of potential allies into anti-US guerrillas. **(Attachment 7)**

Rick Barton, an analyst with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said most Iraqis will welcome the change, though it may reinforce the impression the Coalition invaded without a coherent plan to run the country. **(Attachment 7)**

In response to a question at a May 18, 2004, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iraq’s transition Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said:

One can go back and look at many things that maybe we needed to do differently, and we are doing that. And I agree with the spirit of your question, that if we want to set the course going forward, then it's important to figure out if we made some misjudgments in the past.

And I would say one that we believe was done a bit too severely was the policy of De-Ba’athification, and that's in fact why Ambassador Bremer announced just a couple of weeks ago that we were going to look at modifying it. **(Web Resource 2)**

Underestimating Iraqi Resistance

On February 27, 2003, during a congressional hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the recent estimate by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq was "wildly off the mark." Pentagon officials put the figure closer to 100,000 troops needed for postwar Iraq. **(Attachment 8)**

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer who believes Saddam Hussein developed a three-pronged strategic approach for dealing with the Coalition forces. Anderson outlined his approach in an April 2, 2003, *Washington Post* editorial. Phase I of Hussein's plan assumed eventual defeat in a conventional war. If defeat is inevitable, Hussein would make the most of it by attempting to turn Baghdad into an Arab Alamo and make "Remember Baghdad" a battle cry, not just for future generations but also for the rest of this war. At this point Hussein would then go into hiding or exile, portraying himself as having led a glorious struggle against imperialism and vowing to continue. **(Attachment 9)**

The second phase would be a protracted guerrilla war against the occupation. The war would be waged as an attritional struggle against the occupying forces and any Iraqi interim government. Attempts at free elections would be subverted and portrayed as a sham. The strategic objective of this phase would be to have the Coalition tire of the effort and turn it over to the United Nations. **(Attachment 9)**

Phase III would then be to amass enough semi-conventional power to overwhelm the United Nations and interim government mechanisms. In other words, the concept would be to stage a combination of "Black Hawk Down" and the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive that crushed South Vietnam. **(Attachment 9)**

In response to a question about miscalculations at a May 18, 2004 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iraq's transition, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said:

I would say of all the things that were underestimated, the one that almost no one that I know of predicted, with the exception of a retired Marine colonel named Gary Anderson who wrote this in a op-ed piece in *The [Washington] Post* I believe it was April 2nd of

last year, was to properly estimate the resilience of the regime that had abused this country for 35 years; to properly estimate that Saddam Hussein would still be out there funding attacks on Americans until he was captured; that one of his principal deputies, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, would still be out there funding operations against us; that they would have hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts in neighboring countries to support those operations; that the old Iraqi intelligence service, which had so much blood on its hands, which I believe is not reconcilable, we're not talking about an ordinary person who joined the Ba'ath Party in order to get a promotion as a teacher: Those are the people we're trying to bring back in. **(Web Resource 2)**

Other Controversial Policy Decisions

Many believe allowing Iraq cities to be looted by criminals and lawlessness to prevail for the first few weeks after major hostilities ended contributed to a general sense by the Iraqis that the Coalition forces did not have enough manpower to prevent this anarchy. Leaving weapons' caches unguarded allowed insurgents to gain access and steal weapons to use against Coalition forces. Disbanding the Iraqi military and initially cutting off soldiers' pensions provided a manpower source to the insurgents. **(Attachment 10)**

Progress in Iraq

Even though there have been miscalculations, there has been considerable progress made in helping Iraqis move beyond occupation to a fully constitutional government. Saddam Hussein's regime has been driven out of power by Coalition forces. The Coalition Provisional Authority is in the process of transferring authority to an Interim Iraqi Government. A Transitional Administrative Law has been written establishing the basis for the rule of law in Iraq. Iraq's infrastructure is being rebuilt, and control of oil assets is in the hands of the Iraqis. With the help of oil revenues the Iraqi economy is on the road to recovery. Most importantly, the United Nations Security Council voted to support a new Iraqi government, and help steer the country toward democratic elections. President George W. Bush, has outlined a five-step plan: Transferring Authority, Establishing Security, Rebuilding the Infrastructure, Enlisting International Support, and Transitioning Iraq into a Constitutional Government. **(Attachment 11)**

Major General David Patreus, then Commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), told Newsweek Magazine, “At the end of the day you don’t defeat an insurgency solely with military forces. You’ve got to capture or kill the bad guys, but you win by getting the people to believe they have a stake in the success of the new Iraq.”⁸

The witnesses for the hearing were asked to address the following questions:

- What events precipitated the change in Iraqi attitudes from jubilation over the fall of Hussein to a high profile insurgency against Coalition personnel?
- What factors caused the security environment to deteriorate?
- To what extent did the Coalition succeed in fostering political reforms in Iraq?
- What is your judgment of the Coalition’s efforts to distribute aid and development funds, rebuild infrastructure, and create a stable economy generating needed jobs for Iraqis?
- Why did Coalition and U.S. government public diplomacy efforts fail to reach the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people?
- To what extent has the United States government succeeded in building Iraqi confidence in, and cooperation with, Coalition efforts to create social cohesion, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and economic well being in Iraq?

⁸ Evan Thomas, “Operation Hearts and Minds,” *Newsweek*, December 29, 2003.

DISCUSSION OF HEARING ISSUES

1. What policy decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority contributed to changes in Iraqi confidence and cooperation?

During congressional testimony, Administration officials pointed to three miscalculations contributing to changes in Iraqi confidence and cooperation with the Coalition Provisional Authority. Mr. Armitage pointed out the CPA focused their attention on the Iraqi religious sheiks rather than on Iraqi tribal sheiks. While religion is certainly important to the majority of Iraqis, family and tribes are equally important. **(Web Resource 2)**

However, at the same time it should be noted Iraq is no Saudi Arabia or Jordan, where a single tribe dispenses privileges and defines the culture. Iraq is a mix of urbanites and farmers, Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, Christians and Turkmen, and Arabs and Kurds, most of whom, in normal times, count their tribal root as just one facet among many in their identity. **(Attachment 12)**

Mr. Wolfowitz testified that De-Ba'athification was a miscalculation. The result of this policy decision and its aggressive implementation was that almost every government employee who was a Ba'athist was either removed from their job or investigated to determine their allegiance to the old or new regime. Consequently, the government was at a standstill with few employees and no services. This meant no police leadership. With few law enforcement officials available, murder, armed robbery, auto theft and kidnappings took place. This miscalculation resulted in some Iraqis wondering if the new leadership in Iraq was worse than the old regime.

(Web Resource 2 and Attachment 6)

Mr. Wolfowitz also testified that planners for Iraq underestimated the resilience of Saddam Hussein's regime. The planners believed the Iraqis would welcome the Coalition forces with open arms, and there was no need for more than 100,000 to 150,000 Coalition forces to maintain stability. Consequently the need for a force of 200,000 to 300,000 was not required. A smaller number of military could adequately maintain stability in Iraq. Unfortunately this assumption was wrong,

and as Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation explains, we should not have allowed an insurgency to get started in Iraq. **(Attachment 13)**

2. What steps does the United States need to take to regain the confidence and cooperation of the Iraqi people?

There are indications, even though there were miscalculations that led to instability, the situation can be salvaged and a constitutional government established in Iraq. President Bush's five-step plan for helping Iraqis move beyond occupation, if properly implemented, should put Iraq on the road to a constitutional government. Mr. Wolfowitz outlined the implementation plan in a Wall Street Journal article. **(Attachment 11)**

Security is of course the most important step in the plan. And as Mr. Wolfowitz points out, Iraqis must be the ones to eventually provide for their own security. Dividing the security situation in three regions of Iraq is useful in determining where the new Multi-National Force should concentrate its forces. The model for a stable and secure environment is the North Eastern part of Iraq where the Kurdish peoples keep tight control over the region. Most of Southern Iraq is stable, however religious elements in the South continue to be problematic. The Central region, to include Baghdad will require the most emphasis. **(Attachment 11)**

Mr. Wolfowitz stated, "The assistance of the international community will continue to be important for helping Iraq stand on its own feet." This is the second most important step in the plan. With the latest United Nations Resolution supporting the new Iraqi government the United States should redouble efforts to bring in other nations to help with stabilizing, rebuilding and assisting Iraq move toward a constitutional government. **(Attachment 11)**

There will scores of governments and agencies involved in the effort to rebuild Iraq and establish a constitutional government. What will be needed is a program to unify all the various elements of support for Iraq. The program should merge American civil and military programs belonging to separate government agencies under a single manager, enabling the manager to devise an integrated program to counter all facets of the insurgent political and military threat.

ATTACHMENTS

1. GlobalSecurity.Org, *Iraqi Tribal Structures*.
2. John Tierney, "Iraqi Family Ties Complicate American Efforts for Change," *New York Times*, September 27, 2003.
3. Salah Nasrawi, "Iraq divided by tribes, religious factions," *Associated Press*, June 5, 2004.
4. Sebastian Rotella, "Taking Iraqi Customs to Heart," *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 2004.
5. Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System," *The Brookings Institution Iraq Memo #18*, July 8, 2003.
6. John Daniszewski, "After the War," *Los Angeles Times*, May 27, 2003.
7. Associated Press, "Bremer Softens Baath Party Ban in Iraq," *USA Today*, April 24, 2004.
8. Eric Schmitt, "Threats and Responses: Military Spending," *The New York Times*, February 28, 2003.
9. Gary Anderson, "Saddam's Greater Game," *The Washington Post*, April 2, 2003.
10. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Remarks at the Center for Defense Information Board of Directors Dinner, May 12, 2004.
11. Paul Wolfowitz, "The Road Map For A Sovereign Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 2004.
12. Susam Sachs, "In Iraq's Next Act, Tribes may Play The Lead Role," *New York Times*, June 6, 2004.
13. Bruce Hoffman, "Plan of Attack," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2004.

Web Resources

1. University of Phoenix, *Iraq Religious Report*, found at http://atheism.about.com/library/irf/irf03/blirf_iraq
2. United States Senate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, *Iraq Transition*, May 18, 2004, found at <http://foreign.senate.gov>.
3. Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, found at <http://www.cpa-iraq.org>.

Witness List

Panel I

Ambassador Rend al-Rahim
Iraqi Interests Section

Panel II

William Joseph Burns (invited)
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Douglas Feith (invited)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Office of Secretary of Defense

Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios (invited)
Administrator
US Agency for International Development

Witness List (cont.)

Panel III

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Ret.) (invited)

Chair, Combating Terrorism Center
United States Military Academy

Professor Anthony H. Cordesman (invited)

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Richard Galen

Former Director
Strategic Media
Coalition Provisional Authority

Dr. Samer S. Shehata

Center for Contemporary Arab Studies
Georgetown University