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MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations.

From: Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst, and Mr. Christopher Skaluba, Presidential Management Intern.

Subject: Briefing memorandum for the hearing *Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations: Overcoming Barriers—Part II*, scheduled for Friday, July 18, 2003 at 10:00 a.m., room 2318 Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, D.C.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The hearing will examine problems encountered by nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of a military conflict and prospects for overcoming such difficulties.

HEARING ISSUES

- 1. What are the essential requirements for bringing humanitarian assistance to a country following military operations?**
- 2. What progress has been made on the “Eleven Essential Tasks” for making progress in Iraq as outlined by Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay M. Garner during his May 13, 2003 statement to the Subcommittee?**

BACKGROUND

Countries neglected by their rulers and devastated by war require assistance, as well as a stable environment from which to rebuild. A long-term assistance and rebuilding effort combines military, humanitarian, political, and economic measures in order to bring stability and lasting peace.

Humanitarian assistance following military operations is provided to save lives, alleviate suffering, and mitigate the impact of emergency situations. This assistance is subdivided into several categories such as health and medical, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shelter and supplies, infrastructure, and general support to refugees. **(Web Resource 1)**

The United States and other countries of the international community have a considerable amount of experience providing humanitarian assistance, especially to countries devastated by war. Lessons learned from these experiences could be applied to rebuilding Iraq. The events in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan

demonstrated essential requirements for stability and showcase numerous challenges.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has noted that past experiences point to two essential requirements in bringing humanitarian assistance and stability to a country overrun by war: a secure environment and strong leadership.¹ The former of these is self-evident, while the latter of these is required to coordinate the efforts of the multitude of people and organizations providing assistance. While the security environments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan were different, each required a level of safety for agencies to operate. Without requisite freedom of action, lives will not be saved and suffering will not be alleviated. There are thousands of military and civilians in Iraq attempting to keep the peace, provide humanitarian assistance and rebuild the country. Strong leadership is needed to coordinate the efforts of this mass of humanity and point it in the right direction. **(Web Resource 2)**

The GAO has also noted the international community has had difficulties providing the required level of military and police resources needed to maintain security and bring stability to post-conflict situations. Additionally, the international community has not provided adequate financial support to these efforts. Most importantly, the scope and complexity of the tasks require extensive and close coordination among all participants involved in the reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. **(Web Resource 2)**

The first Subcommittee hearing on the subject of humanitarian assistance following military operations was held on May 13, 2003. **(Web Resource 3)** Several government and non-government representatives testified we are experiencing challenges in Iraq similar to those encountered in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These challenges include concerns about security of aid workers, coordination of humanitarian efforts, assessing specific needs of noncombatants, and lack of logistical capacity.

¹ The GAO-02-707R audit summarizes work from 33 reports dealing with 16 peace and assistance operations.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay M. Garner, then Director, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)² made a statement to the Subcommittee at the May 13, 2003 hearing. In the statement Garner outlined “Eleven Essential Tasks”³ that ORHA was tackling and that should, in his view, be completed by mid-late June in order to establish a positive “slope” towards success in Iraq.

This hearing focuses on the lessons learned from previous humanitarian assistance and rebuilding efforts following military operations and will use General Garner’s “Eleven Essential Tasks” to gauge progress of humanitarian assistance efforts in Iraq.

Essential Requirements for Stability

On May 22, 2003, the United States and United Kingdom were recognized as occupying powers of Iraq by United Nations Resolution 1483. **(Attachment 1)**

The *Fourth Geneva Convention* (Articles 55 and 59) stipulates that it is the duty of the occupying power to provide necessary assistance to the population of an occupied territory, if this population is inadequately supplied. This assistance may be undertaken by either the occupying power, other states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or equivalent impartial humanitarian organizations. Article 69 of the *Additional Protocol I* expands the scope of this obligation by addressing the needs of the population in terms of food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, or other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population. **(Web Resource 4)**

Security

Iraq is slightly more than twice the size of Idaho, consisting of 437,072 square kilometers. The country shares 3650 km of borders with Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. This expanse of borders is difficult to control. **(Attachment 2—Map of Iraq)**

² ORHA has been re-designated the Office of Coalition Provisional Authority.

³ The “Eleven Essential Tasks” are discussed on pages 12-16 of this memorandum.

In *Embracing Defeat*, Mr. John Dower describes the US occupation of Japan after World War II, and US attempts to develop democracy in Japan. Dower explains that Japan, unlike Iraq, has no porous borders. Nor was Japan surrounded by nations uneasy about US motives. Until the end of the six-year occupation, General Douglas MacArthur virtually sealed Japan off from the rest of the world. Almost no Japanese national was allowed to travel abroad. Remarkably, there was not a single terrorist incident against any of the 250,000 US troops and officials stationed in Japan.

Dower states, “We simply don't have that type of security in Iraq, and I don't think we can expect it in the future. This will seriously impede the business of humanitarian assistance, reform, and reconstruction.” **(Web Resource 3)**

At a June 18, 2003 Pentagon press conference Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld responded to a question about the security situation and continuing American deaths. Rumsfeld said, “In those regions where pockets of dead-enders are trying to reconstitute General Franks and his team are rooting them out. In short, the coalition is making good progress.” **(Attachment 3)**

However, on July 13, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld said, “We expect that the summer is not going to be a peaceful summer.” American officials are bracing for a possible new wave of attacks against US forces during the next week to coincide with anniversaries tied to Saddam Hussein and his followers. The anniversaries include July 14, the date of the 1958 coup against the British-backed monarchy, which under Saddam Hussein was celebrated as Iraq's National Day; July 16, the date that Hussein took power in 1979; and July 17, the date of the Baath Party revolution in 1968. **(Attachment 3)**

In a June 20, 2003 Wall Street Journal editorial, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Administrator of the Coalition Provincial Authority and Presidential Envoy for Iraq, states, “a humanitarian crisis was avoided.” Bremer goes on to say,

“The first prerequisite to growth is the establishment of law and order. Looters and saboteurs have destroyed offices, stores, factories, and government buildings. Deliberate attacks on oil facilities and electricity lines continue to undermine our efforts and hurt the Iraqi people. Fortunately, we have the streets of Baghdad safer, and

Coalition forces are working to root out the last remaining vestiges of the former regime.” **(Attachment 3)**

In a July 13, 2003 New York Times editorial, Ambassador Bremer said, “...progress in Iraq is despised by a narrow band of opponents. A small minority of bitter-enders—members of the former regime’s instruments of repression—oppose freedom. They are joined by foreign terrorists, extreme Islamists, influenced by Iran, and bands of criminals.” **(Attachment 3)**

US Army Lieutenant General John P. Abizaid, who has replaced retiring General Tommy Franks, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), testified at a June 26, 2003 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. He said there is a “... continued threat from three primary groups: foreign fighters, remnants of Mr. Hussein’s Baath Party, and common criminals.” Abizaid also warned of continuing attacks. **(Attachment 3)**

On June 13, 2003, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Coalition Joint Task Force Commander,⁴ told a news conference that in Southern Iraq, “I think things are generally secure, although there are still pockets of subversive elements that we find and have to deal with over time.” Referring to Northern Iraq General McKiernan said, “Great progress there, a lot of businesses are reopening, a lot of commerce happening. But again, there are some Baathist residual cells in that area that we will continue to develop intelligence on and go and apprehend or destroy.”

In the central part of the country, McKiernan said, “we have currently two, what I would call hot spots that you’re well aware of. One is to the west of Baghdad out in the Fallujah area..., The other hot spot is North of Baghdad, and that’s an area we call the peninsula.” McKiernan said the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions are aggressively running patrols and raids in these areas.

McKiernan said, “I will tell you that there are still those that are loyal to a regime that is no longer in power that we will continue to have to seek out, close with and either apprehend them or destroy them. And that will take some time. It is still a combat operation” **(Attachment 3)**

⁴General McKiernan commands all ground forces in Iraq.

There are indications that security will continue to be a problem and hamper humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. Since the announcement ending hostilities in Iraq on May 1, 2003, 33 military service members (as of July 14, 2003) have been killed in Iraq by hostile fire. **(Attachment 4)**

While American forces bear the brunt of the attacks in Iraq, humanitarian assistance groups are also being fired upon. A mortar shell hit a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Samarra, Iraq, about 75 miles north of Baghdad. One Iraqi was killed and 12 injured. The CMOC coordinates humanitarian assistance efforts between the military, civilian and non-government agencies. Additionally, on July 6, 2003, the World Food Program office in Mosul was targeted in a grenade attack. **(Attachment 4)**

International oil companies are postponing visits to Iraq because of continued insecurity. The Pentagon has warned companies hoping to operate in Iraq that they will have to provide their own security and company representatives' movements will be restricted. One oil company official said, "We are still looking to get people on the ground, but we re not going to put anyone in there before we do a full-scale security audit." Lack of security could set back by weeks the timing of reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. **(Attachment 4)**

Britain's International Development Secretary Baroness Amos summed up the security situation in Iraq by stating "...the security effort in Iraq was far from complete in the wake of the killing of six British soldiers. There are undoubted problems. Without getting the security environment right, it's going to be very difficult indeed to deal with all the other issues of concern," **(Attachment 4)**

Ambassador Bremer points out that providing security in Iraq is a pressing priority. However, the security situation is far from resolved and concerns about security are hindering efforts to provide adequate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts to Iraq.

Leadership and Coordination

As required by Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11), the Office and Management and Budget sent a report to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on

United States strategy regarding activities related to post-conflict security, humanitarian assistance, governance, and reconstruction in Iraq that are undertaken as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The report spells out US policy goals for the recovery of Iraq:

- Establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people and the conduct of relief and recovery activities;
 - Achieve measurable improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people;
 - Maximize contributions from other countries and organizations; and
 - Support Iraqis as they prepare for democratic self-government.
- (Attachment 5)**

The Pentagon initially sent retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to Iraq. He was the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The mission of ORHA was to govern post war Iraq—providing civil administration, infrastructure repair, and humanitarian assistance—until an interim government was established. The ultimate goal of ORHA was to establish:

“A unified Iraq, with an Iraqi national identity that respects tribal, ethnic and religious heritages. Governed by a broad-based, freely elected government that adheres to the rule of law, Iraq is neither a threat to the region nor a supporter of WMD or terrorism. The nation will adopt and develop a viable, free market-based economy.” **(Web Resource 3)**

On May 12, 2003 General Garner was replaced by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, and given the title of Presidential Envoy, and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).⁵ Bremer oversees, directs and coordinates all US Government programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the authority of the Commander, CENTCOM. **(Attachment 5)**

The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, exercised consistent with the relevant United Nations resolutions, including Resolution 1483. The CPA

⁵ ORHA was re-designated CPA.

exercises power of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi People can freely determine their own political future, and facilitate economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development. **(Attachment 5)**

As Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander CENTCOM directly supports the CPA by deterring hostilities, maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security, searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction, and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy. An interagency team supports the CPA with the mission to help meet Iraq's relief, reconstruction, governmental, and administrative challenges. The Department of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice, and 13 other executive branch agencies are providing personnel support to the CPA. **(Attachment 5)**

The CPA also establishes priorities for the execution of all US Agency for International Development (USAID) activities including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and Disaster Resistance Response Team (DART) operations in Iraq. Along with USAID and the DART, the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration is helping the United Nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in providing emergency relief and support for humanitarian efforts. **(Attachment 5)**

The United States is actively seeking the involvement of foreign partners and international organizations in post-conflict Iraq. Numerous foreign governments have contributed military, humanitarian, and economic assistance to the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction effort in Iraq. **(Attachment 5)**

While the bulk of the 200,000 military personnel in Iraq are US forces, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland have combat forces in country. Many countries have offered in-kind contributions of relief supplies. Field hospitals and adopt-a-hospital efforts are being hosted by several countries. Additional nations are preparing to send personnel, equipment and supplies to Iraq to assist in the relief efforts. **(Attachment 5)**

Additionally, international and non-governmental organizations are also active in Iraq. The United Nations has a significant presence with almost 300 international staff. **(Attachment 5)** There are many non-government organizations providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq. These organizations and their addresses can be found on the Internet at <http://interaction.org/iraq>. Three of the non-governmental organizations working in Iraq will send representatives to testify at the hearing.

CARE's mission is to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world. CARE promotes innovative solutions and advocates global responsibility. The agency facilitates change by strengthening capacity for self-help, providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in emergencies, influencing policy decisions at all levels, and addressing discrimination in all its forms.

CARE has worked in Iraq since 1991 assisting the children in Iraq that are chronically malnourished. Throughout the current conflict, CARE's staff in Iraq chose to remain, and as conditions have allowed, have been working to deliver vital assistance to children and other vulnerable groups.

In Baghdad, CARE Iraq staff distributed hygienic supplies and delivered emergency water to hospitals and health centers. They also have conducted repairs to restore water flows to operating rooms. Even when security concerns forced temporary relocation out of Baghdad, CARE staff continued relief efforts. Using 62 pre-positioned water tanks and supplies, they delivered clean water to 25,000 people in areas west of the city. CARE also distributed hygienic goods and lactose-free milk for malnourished children. CARE staff are returning to the capital city as conditions permit. **(Web Resource 5)**

Save the Children works with families to define and solve problems children and communities face. The organization utilizes a broad array of strategies to ensure family self-sufficiency. Responding to international emergencies, Save the Children has evolved into a leading international relief and development organization.

Save The Children delivered cooking fuel to Umm Qasr, a port-town near the Kuwait border. The relief agency distributed more than 2,100 canisters of propane

gas. As a result, nearly half the families in the city will now be able to use gas stoves for the first time since the war began.

Additionally, Save the Children aid workers recently entered Basra, Iraq's second largest city. Conducting the first assessment of Basra's humanitarian situation, Save the Children's team of four aid workers found security remains a top concern for Basra's 1.2 million residents. Basra citizens told aid workers the city remains unsafe, especially at night when sporadic shootings take place.

The US military has not yet declared Basra safe for private relief agencies to begin delivering critical supplies, including water and cooking fuel. Once the military declares Basra safe for humanitarian workers, Save the Children plans to begin delivering assistance and to set up a regional office. **(Web Resource 6)**

World Vision International is a Christian relief and development organization working for the well being of all people, especially children. Through emergency relief, education, health care, economic development and promotion of justice, World Vision helps communities help themselves.

On May 1, 2003, World Vision made its first delivery of humanitarian aid inside Iraq, rushing medicines and relief supplies to a desert town whose hospital was completely destroyed during the first few days of the war. A team of three World Vision relief staff handed over \$11,000 worth of medical supplies, blankets, plastic sheeting and jerry cans to doctors at Al Rutba Hospital, 130 km inside Iraq.

Until World Vision's delivery, the hospital had run out of painkillers. The supplies are vitally important because increasing numbers of children are suffering from blast wounds received while playing with abandoned Iraqi weaponry. The delivery was followed up by a two-day assessment. The Iraqi doctors are looking at converting the former headquarters of the Baath Party into a temporary facility to create a unit with 20-beds. World Vision will assist with this effort. **(Web Resource 7)**

Coordination mechanisms are being established between the CPA and coalition partners, and international and non-governmental organizations. There are non-US officials on the CPA staff—most notably from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and other nations have sent liaison officials to work on the staff. The

United Nations Secretary General appointed Mr. Sergio Vieira De Mello as the Special Representative for Iraq. De Mello is working with Ambassador Bremer on humanitarian relief operations. **(Attachment 5)**

The US Agency for International Development (USAID), under the supervision of the CPA, administers the humanitarian assistance grants and contracts program. Thus far almost \$600,000,000 of assistance has been provided to Iraq by USAID and the Department of State. This funding is categorized into emergency relief, reconstruction, and cooperative agreements for quick reaction projects dealing with food, water and health needs. Additionally, other nations have contributed an additional \$1.2 billion of assistance to Iraq. **(Attachment 6)** The International Organizations (IO) and NGOs use this funding to get the necessary assistance into the devastated areas.

However, some humanitarian assistance groups are turning down work in Iraq. The International Rescue Committee, CARE and World Vision Inc. all declined to participate in a \$35 million aid program to rebuild schools and health clinics. The humanitarian assistance agencies believe there is too much military control over civilian organizations working in Iraq to permit them to be effective and maintain their independence and impartiality. Additionally, other humanitarian assistance groups, such as Save the Children, object to a demand to filter all contact with journalists through USAID. **(Attachment 7)**

“Eleven Essential Tasks”

Mapping plans for postwar Iraq before the war ended, retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner foresaw hordes of refugees, and poison gas clouds lingering over the Iraqi landscape. He envisioned extensive destruction and the need for swift and massive amounts of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian crisis never developed. **(Web Resource 3)**

General Garner, as the Director, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), was confronted with a separate set of challenges—a small staff of a few hundred people with few communication capabilities, and chaos in the streets of Baghdad. **(Web Resource 3)**

At the May 13, 2003 Subcommittee hearing General Garner outlined “Eleven Essential Tasks” for ORHA. Garner said these tasks should be completed by mid-late June in order to establish a positive “slope” towards success in Iraq. These tasks were part of a broader, long-term effort combining political, military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. **(Web Resource 3)**

1. Establish security in Baghdad.
2. Pay civil services salaries.
3. Get police trained and back to work.
4. Get government ministries to function.
5. Restore basic services in Baghdad to pre-war levels or better.
6. Prevent a fuel crisis.
7. Purchase crops.
8. Solve food distribution system gaps.
9. Install town councils in all communities.
10. Reestablish provincial governments, target specific needs.
11. Prevent disease (cholera) outbreaks.

Establish security in Baghdad:

On June 20, 2003, Mr. Ross W. Wherry, US Agency for International Development senior reconstruction adviser for Asia and the Near East said, the concerns have increased security costs substantially. “I begrudge that because I believe the money spent on security could be better spent providing services.” **(Attachment 8)**

On June 29, 2003, Ambassador Bremer confirmed the security concerns when he said that Hussein loyalists may be targeting Iraqi civilians “as a way to intimidate people from working on reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.” He went on to say the attacks on US forces appear to be the work of former soldiers and paramilitary fighters who are probably working in small, independent cells. **(Attachment 8)**

In a July 13, 2003 editorial Ambassador Bremer said, “These shadowy figures are killing brave Iraqis working with us, attacking soldiers and civilians, and trying to sabotage the fragile infrastructure. The attacks have drawn concern worldwide.

My coalition colleagues and Iraqi friends have noticed that the attacks are often aimed at successes in the renewal of this nation.” **(Attachment 3)**

The new Commander of Central Command, General John P. Abizaid said, “The best protection that we can give our soldiers is an offensive spirit in a tough place. They need to go out and seek the enemy, they need to bring the fight to the enemy and they need to defeat the enemy.” **(Attachment 3)**

Pay civil services salaries:

On June 3, 2003, the CPA announced the layoff of 500,000 Iraqi military and government civilian personnel. The CPA hopes to make cash termination payments to the military and civilian personnel who are laid off. **(Attachment 9)**

On June 11, 2003, the CPA began paying back salaries to public employees, and on June 25, the CPA announced that interim monthly stipends would be paid to former Iraqi soldiers and their families. **(Attachment 9)**

Get police trained and back to work:

The first Transition Integration Program—a three-week course to remake the attitudes and behavior of the Iraqi police—is underway. American military police instructors teach the Iraqi police force about democratic policing. For now, the American military is Iraq’s police force, operating 1,000 daily patrols nationwide, in some cases accompanied by newly trained Iraqi police. **(Attachment 10)** Ambassador Bremer points out that there are tens of thousands of Iraqi policemen on duty and more graduate each day. Recently, 250 Iraqi police recruits graduated from the program, however a bomb killed seven of these new officers. **(Attachment 3)**

Get government ministries to function:

When Garner arrived in Iraq on April 20, 2003, looters had destroyed 17 of the 20 Baghdad government ministry buildings they expected to use. When the war ended, government employees stayed home, police fled and rule of law was nonexistent. Since it will take time for these ministries to function properly,

Ambassador Bremer decided not to hand over power to an interim Iraqi government, and instead allow the CPA to govern Iraq. **(Attachment 11)**

Restore basic services in Baghdad to pre-war levels or better:

Looting, lawlessness and unreliable electricity have handicapped or crippled hundreds of water lines, sewage treatment plants, pumping stations, and depleted supply warehouses. In the southern port city of Basra, where ground water is naturally salty and water wells are useless, humanitarian organizations began reporting an alarming shortage in potable water as far back as April.

On May 15, the newly arrived Administrator, Ambassador Bremer, said Basra's water quality is good. "Better than it has been in years." The pronouncement was in stark contrast with comments from World Health Organization representatives who were warning of waterborne epidemics in Iraq's second-largest city. **(Attachment 12)**

The Pentagon said Bremer based his conclusion about the water supply in Basara in part on the high levels of chlorine detected at Basra's water treatment plants. Non-governmental organizations counter that water supplies should not be checked at treatment plants, but in the homes of Iraqi citizens. Humanitarian aid workers in the field were checking the water lines running into town and the tap water in residential homes and found no chlorine, only pollution. **(Attachment 12)**

Additionally, two officials overseeing the effort to rebuild Iraq said the electricity and drinking water available in Baghdad and some other parts of the country remained below prewar levels. Mr. Andrew Bearpark, the Coalition Provisional Authority's Director of Regional Services said that electricity in Baghdad was being redirected to other parts of the country even though the lack of power in the capital had been cited as one reason for the continuing violence. Drinking water in Baghdad could be restored to prewar levels by the end of July, but efforts to treat raw sewage pouring into the Tigris River is still months away. **(Attachment 12)**

Prevent a fuel crisis:

Attacks on pipelines have disrupted utilities. Although the lines at gas stations all but disappeared in recent weeks, the lines are back because the gas pumps rely on

electricity for power. The impact of power outage has been compounded by the paralysis of the water system, which also relies on electrical pumps to move the water into homes. While not a crisis now, this lack of power could turn into a crisis for some areas of Iraq. **(Web Resource 8)**

Before the war, Iraq's wells were pumping more than 2.5 million barrels of crude oil a day, but production was shut down during the initial days of the conflict. The Iraqi Oil Ministry said it produced about 700,000 barrels in one day and predicted that output would be restored to prewar levels by the middle of next year. **(Attachment 13)**

Purchase crops/ Solve food distribution system gaps:

During a May 16, 2003 news conference, Ambassador Bremer said the United Nations has agreed to use the Oil-for-Food Program (the United Nations provides food to Iraq in exchange for oil) money to purchase the Iraqi cereal crop, which is now being harvested. **(Attachment 14)**

Before the war, 60 percent of Iraq's 24 million people depended upon the United Nations World Food Program for food. Immediately following hostilities, the US military began distributing food rations. The World Food Program has resumed the distribution of food rations and is using food distribution centers and former Iraqi military personnel to assist with the distribution. **(Attachment 14)**

Reestablish provincial governments/Install town councils in all communities:

The CPA has come under criticism for canceling a planned convention of Iraqis that would have elected an interim government. Instead the CPA appointed a council of 25 Iraqis to advise the CPA. On June 7, Ambassador Bremer agreed to appoint an interim Iraqi council that has power to select government ministers and international representatives. **(Attachment 15)**

A team of 150 Iraqi exiles was assembled by the Pentagon to advise American authorities during the early phases of the Iraqi occupation. The team, known as the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council, consist of advisors to assist the CPA rebuild 23 central ministries and 18 provisional governments. Most of these

advisors are now in Iraq assisting with the establishment of provisional governments. **(Attachment 15)**

On June 2, 2003, the US Agency for International Development held a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Umm Qasr, Iraq's port city. Three democracy projects funded by the US Government were handed over to the Umm Qasr transitional town council. **(Attachment 15)**

A 37-member group was designated as the Baghdad City Council on July 8, 2003. This city council consists of 23 Shiite Muslims, nine Sunni Muslims, three Kurds, and two Christians. Six of the council members are women. Additionally Ambassador Bremer is trying to set up a national governing council by the end of July. The council will have the authority to help appoint ministers, and revamp the judicial system. **(Attachment 15)**

Prevent disease (cholera) outbreaks:

All major hospitals in Baghdad are operating. However, electricity outages and water sanitation continues to be a problem for citizens of Iraq and the health facilities. **(Attachment 16)**

Mr. Andrew Clements, a health advisor with the US Agency for International Development, said health services had been disrupted by the war and equipment, medicines and supplies had been looted. However, these problems are being corrected. There were several confirmed cases of cholera in the city of Basra, but there has not been a major outbreak of disease. **(Attachment 16)**

Witnesses from the General Accounting Office, Department of State, US Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations (CARE, World Vision, Inc., Save the Children), and retired Lieutenant Jay M. Garner are expected to answer the following questions:

- What lessons have been learned from previous humanitarian assistance efforts (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) and applied to the ongoing operations in Iraq?

- What lessons has the United States learned after more than two months of directing humanitarian efforts in Iraq?
- What barriers are being encountered by the US Government and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people?
- How has instability in certain regions of Iraq hampered efforts by NGOs to effectively administer humanitarian assistance?
- What progress has been made on each of General Garner’s “Eleven Essential Tasks?”
- Has Ambassador Bremer modified any of Garner’s essential tasks? If the tasks have been modified, what new objectives have been introduced from which progress can be measured?
- What types and amounts of humanitarian assistance have been provided to the Iraqi people, and has such assistance been appropriate to the post-conflict environment?
- What challenges have been encountered coordinating interagency efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, and how have these challenges been overcome?

DISCUSSION OF HEARING ISSUES

1. What are the essential requirements for bringing humanitarian assistance to a country following military operations?

The Bush Administration and CPA officials have said security problems will not stop the ongoing humanitarian assistance and rebuilding efforts, nor will the attacks stop continued efforts to support Iraqis as they prepare for democratic self-government. Coalition forces planned in advance to address the likely food and water shortages. In many cases Coalition forces took on the humanitarian assistance role. For example, immediately following combat operations, and in some cases parallel to such operations, the military pushed food and water supplies as far forward as possible. This helped prevent a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. (**Web Resource 3**)

However, the soldiers assisting with humanitarian aid and also the security patrols in Iraq are trained for infantry, armor, artillery, and engineer combat missions. These soldiers are trained primarily in techniques to kill and destroy, and not in providing humanitarian assistance, policing, rebuilding, or public administration functions. Nor are these types of soldiers trained to deal with civilians establishing civilian governments.

The second essential requirement in bringing stability to a country after military operations is leadership. When General Garner arrived in the CENTCOM theatre of operations, he reported to General Franks. However, it was unclear how much authority General Garner was authorized. Ambassador Bremer is not only the Administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority, he is also the Presidential Envoy to Iraq, and is at least equal in rank to the Commander of CENTCOM.

Bremer appears to be exercising strong leadership, even though he sometimes changes his decisions. Bremer disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, but still pays these forces a monthly stipend. Bremer also said that he will hold off for the time being with the establishment of an interim Iraqi government, however he

established an Iraqi council that is authorized to appoint an interim Iraqi council with power to select government ministers and international representatives.

A sub-element of the requirement of leadership for a war-torn country is coordination. While Bremer appears to be establishing the framework for effective coordination among the multitude of agencies providing assistance, the actions of agencies in Washington may be hindering his efforts. The US Agency for International Development Director, Mr. Andrew Natsios, gave a speech criticizing non-governmental organizations for failing to publicize the fact that much of the humanitarian assistance being provided to Iraq and Afghanistan is provided by the United States. **(Attachment 17)** Additionally, USAID told several non-governmental organizations that have been awarded humanitarian aid contracts that they cannot speak to the media—all requests from reporters must go through Washington. **(Attachment 17)**

2. What progress has been made on the “Eleven Essential Tasks” for making progress in Iraq as outlined by Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay M. Garner during his May 13, 2003 testimony to the Subcommittee?

Although there continues to be security and other problems in Iraq, progress is being made in a number of areas. This is due to the efforts of not only Ambassador Bremer but also of the initial efforts of retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner.

When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld presented Garner with the Department of Defense Distinguished Medal for Public Service in recognition for his exceptionally distinguished service as the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, he said Garner did an absolutely superb job in Iraq. During the Pentagon award ceremony Rumsfeld took the opportunity to review progress in Iraq. **(Attachment 18)** Garner’s task was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services; to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts among U.S., coalition and nongovernmental agencies and organizations; to begin working with Iraqi leaders to help them start the process of building a free society.

Rumsfeld said Garner accomplished these tasks exceedingly well. Within days of his arrival, the power was restored in many areas and work began to initiate the power in the rest of the country. Today, the water system is operating at about 80 percent of prewar level, with some parts of the country reporting cleaner water than existed prior to the conflict. Within weeks, Garner's team had recalled Iraqi civil servants to work and began paying salaries and pensions from seized Hussein regime funds to some 2 million people.

In the north and south, electric service is better than it has been in 12 years. Basra has power 24 hours a day; Baghdad is now averaging electrical service close to 18-20 hours a day. Gas lines for cars are disappearing, and production and the importation of gasoline continues at approximately 14 million liters a day.

There has not been a major health crisis. There is not a humanitarian crisis in the country. Doctors and nurses have gone back to work. Public hospitals in Baghdad are functioning and receiving power. Iraqi children are returning to schools. Emergency payments have been made in the Ministry of Education, as well as to some 20,000 teachers in Baghdad. The de-Ba'athification process is underway. And hundreds of individuals have been removed from positions held by the previous regime.

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Witnesses

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