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MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

From: Christopher Shays
Chairman

Date: July 6, 2006

Subject: Briefing memorandum for July 11, 2006 Subcommittee hearing.

Attached find the briefing memorandum required by Committee rules for the hearing on Tuesday, July 11, 2006 entitled, *The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.* The hearing will convene at 2:00 pm in 2154 Rayburn House Office Building.

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July 6, 2006

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

From: Mr. Robert Kelley, Chief Counsel

Re: Briefing memorandum for the hearing *The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* scheduled for July 11, 2006 at 2:00 p.m. in room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The hearing will examine the evolution of US strategy for Iraq, comparing the November 2005 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" with the White House June 13, 2006 Fact Sheet "Camp David Meetings: Building on Progress in Iraq," assessing if these plans address the characteristics of an effective national strategy.

HEARING ISSUES

1. Do the strategies for victory in Iraq contain the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy?

2. How important is national reconciliation to the strategy for victory in Iraq?

3. What are the characteristics of an effective national reconciliation strategy?

BACKGROUND

The United States strategy for Iraq is formally expressed in two principal documents:

> 1) November 2005 "The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" (NSVI), published by the White House National Security Council (**Attachment 1**), and
>
> 2) June 12, 2006 "Fact Sheet: Camp David Meetings: Building on Progress in Iraq." (**Attachment 2**)

A comparison of these two documents indicates a two-fold evolution in strategy: from the general to the specific in the description of US actions, and, in the time frame, from a long-term to a near-term focus.

<u>The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq</u>

The NSVI sets out a three-track strategy for victory in Iraq—political, security and economic. The NSVI defined victory as an Iraq that has defeated the terrorists, neutralized the insurgency and is "peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure." (**Attachment 1**)

The means to that ultimate victory are described in general terms. For example, on the political track the NSVI describes the means as "helping the Iraqi government:"

"Isolate enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq…,

Engage those outside the political process and invite in those willing to turn away from violence through ever-expanding avenues of peaceful participation…, and

Build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis..." (**Attachment 1**)

On the security track, the NSVI, for example, describes the means as:

"Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive...,

Hold areas freed from enemy control by ensuring they remain under the control of a peaceful Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security presence…, and

Build Iraqi Security Forces ..." (Attachment 1)

On the economic track, the NSVI describes the means as:

"Restore Iraq's neglected infrastructure so it can meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy…,

Reform Iraq's economy...so that it can be self-sustaining in the future…, and

Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the international community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis." (**Attachment 1**)

There is some detail under each of these tracks that identifies concrete problems; for example, the NSVI states that the political track's "isolate-engage-build" strategy will result in:

"inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority protections [that] demonstrate to disaffected Sunnis that they

> have the influence and the ability to protect their interests in a democratic Iraq." (**Attachment 1**)

But the NSVI does not specify how these inclusive institutions will come about, or how and when negotiations to create them and the power-sharing mechanisms will take place.

The NSVI states that victory in Iraq will be achieved in three stages, short-, medium-, and long-term:

> "...victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy's surrender, or be signaled by a single particular event...the ultimate victory will be achieved in stages..."

And the NSVI states that it is in the long-term stage that victory in Iraq will be achieved.

The June 12, 2006 Camp David Fact Sheet: New US "Specific Actions" to Advance the Strategy of Iraq Prime Minister Maliki

On June 12, the White House issued "Fact Sheet: Camp David Meetings: Building on Progress in Iraq." (**Attachment 2**) The Fact Sheet was released at the close of the President's meetings that day with his National Security team and key Cabinet members and before the President flew to Baghdad for his meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki.

The Fact Sheet set out a number of "specific actions" the United States will take in "the short term" to advance the strategy of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. The Prime Minister, in a June 9 Op-Ed article in The Washington Post entitled "Our Strategy for a Democratic Iraq," set out a three-part strategy: 1) improve security and promote national reconciliation; 2) increase oil and electricity production; and 3) engage other nations in the Middle East and the world in Iraq's development. (**Attachment 3)**

To "advance Prime Minister Maliki's strategy," the Camp David Fact Sheet specified actions the United States would take in the "short term" to advance the Prime Minister's strategy:

- Military Operations and Militia Control: the US military will conduct military operations with Iraqi forces to secure Baghdad and

Ramadi, and establish new programs to bring militias under control of the Iraqi Government.

- Regional Diplomacy: the United States will embark on increased diplomatic efforts asking countries in the region to "reach out to Iraq's communities to encourage national dialogue, full political participation, and renunciation of violence."

- US Cabinet Members' Visits to Iraq for Oil and Electricity Improvements: the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce will visit Iraq to discuss what assistance is required to increase oil production and electricity generation.

- "International Compact" and International Conference: the Treasury Department Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and State Department Counselor Phillip Zelikow will visit the United Nations, Iraq, Europe, Asia and the Middle East to build an "International Compact" and prepare an international conference later this year to "make Iraq's success a shared objective and commitment." (**Attachment 1**)

Following the release of the June 13 Camp David Fact Sheet, two related announcements specified in even greater detail US strategic initiatives. These were 1) President Bush's June 14 Press Conference, (**Attachment 4**) 2) Ambassador Khalilzad's June 25 Press Conference (**Attachment 6**) and his June 26 interview with David Ignatius. (**Attachment 7**)

President Bush's June 14 Press Conference: United States Support for National Reconciliation and Suggested Use of Oil to "Unify" Iraq

On his return from Baghdad, President Bush held a press conference discussing his talks in Baghdad with Prime Minister Maliki and his Cabinet Ministers. At the press conference, President Bush described two additional strategic initiatives:

- Iraqi Reconciliation Committee: stating that reconciliation was a particular focus of the Baghdad meetings, President Bush reported that Prime Minister Maliki planned to appoint a "Reconciliation Committee" to resolve concerns of the Iraqi Sunni, Shia and Kurdish

communities.

- Use of Oil to Unify Iraq: President Bush reported that he suggested that Iraq "use its energy assets as a way to unite the country...[so that] that people who may not have oil resources in their provinces would have a stake in how the resources are developed elsewhere in the country." (**Attachment 4**)

Prime Minister Maliki's June 25 National Reconciliation Announcement

On June 25, Prime Minister Maliki announced to the Iraqi Parliament his "National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project." **(Attachment 5)** Three of the Project's 24 "principles and required policies" have been emphasized by US officials and policy analysts: 1) reform of the constitution, especially in the allocation of oil revenue; 2) conditional amnesty for insurgents; and 3) reconsideration of de-Baathification.

Ambassador Khalilzad's June 25-26 Statements: US Goal to "End the War" by National Reconciliation

The same day as Prime Minister Maliki's announcement of his "National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project," Ambassador Khalilzad issued a statement in which he termed the Prime Minister's Project a "positive step," and "urged the Iraqi leaders to move expeditiously in implementing this project." (**Attachment 4**) Ambassador Khalizad assured Iraqi leaders of US support for the Project, urged the insurgents "to lay down their arms and join the democratic process," and urged the Parliament to "move on the reconsideration of the de-Baathification Commission." (**Attachment 4**)

On Monday, June 26, Ambassador Khalilzad engaged in a telephone interview with David Ignatius. This conversation appeared as an Ignatius Op-Ed article on June 28, 2006 in the Washington Post. (**Attachment 5**)

Four of the first six paragraphs of that Op-Ed article contained Ambassador Khalilzad's description of the objective to "end the war." The principal means to achieve this objective of an end to the war is through national reconciliation of Sunni insurgents willing to stop violence and join the political process, alongside aggressive military operations against die-hard insurgent groups. The Ignatius article summarized Ambassador Khalilzad's

three part program:

- a joint US-Iraqi committee to discuss the details for a gradual withdrawal of American troops over several years;

- a conditional amnesty for Iraqi insurgents as part of a broader reconciliation effort; and

- negotiations with insurgent groups on terms and conditions for ending the fighting.

The Evolution in Strategy: Comparing the November 2005 NSVI with the June 2006 Camp David Fact Sheet and Its Related Announcements

A comparison of the November 2005 NSVI with the June 2006 Camp David Fact Sheet indicates that the evolution in the strategy centers on a two-fold change: from general statements to specific actions, and from a long-term to a near-term focus.

The NSVI defined victory as a peaceful and unified Iraq, with the insurgency neutralized. According to the NSVI, this objective will be achieved over three time frames: short-, medium-, and long-term, with a peaceful and unified Iraq reached only in the long-term.

In contrast, after the Camp David Fact Sheet and on his return from Baghdad, President Bush described "unifying the country" as something that could be achieved by a single change in Iraqi policy -- to use its oil and gas assets to provide fair treatment for all Iraq's communities, and thereby "unify the country." (**Attachment 4**)

After the June meetings of President Bush with the Iraqi government, Ambassador Khalilzad indicated "ending the war" is an immediate United States objective and this also could be reached by a single overarching achievement—national reconciliation. (**Attachment 6**)

Also, Ambassador Khalilzad identified several components to a successful national reconciliation which are not in the NSVI. These new components include reconsideration of the previous broad sweep of de-Baathification, amnesty for insurgents, a joint US-Iraqi committee to discuss withdrawal of US forces over several years, and negotiations with insurgent to discuss an

end to hostilities. (**Attachment 6**)

The NSVI describes a multitude of actions, mostly described in generic terms, that are to be taken on the three tracks and over short-, medium-, and long-terms. In contrast, the Camp David Fact Sheet spells out a focused number of "specific steps" in the "short term" that the United States and the new Iraqi government will institute.

For example, on the security track, where the NSVI speaks generally about how the United States is helping the Iraqi government to "clear areas of enemy control and hold" them, the Camp David Fact Sheet states that specific operations will be conducted in Baghdad and Ramadi, with the more limited and specific objectives, in Baghdad, of "eliminating safe havens and denying freedom of movement," and in Ramadi, of "stabilizing the city by keeping pressure on terrorists/insurgents."

And where the NSVI speaks in general terms about restoring Iraq's infrastructure, the Camp David Fact Sheet directs the United States Secretaries of Energy and Commerce visit Iraq to determine what is required to increase oil production and electricity generation.

On marshalling international support, the NSVI describes action to "maximize international donor reconstruction assistance;" in contrast, the Camp David Fact Sheet directs the Undersecretary of the Treasury and the State Department Counselor to visit countries throughout the world to turn their pledges of financial assistance into obligations that are met, and to organize an international conference to deliver aid for Iraq's financial and technical support.

Differences between Iraq at the time of the November 2005 NSVI and the June 2006 Camp David Fact Sheet

The evolution this comparison shows between the November 2005 NSVI and the June 2006 Camp David Fact Sheet may in part be caused by the differences in Iraq's situation between November 2005 and June 2006.

Today Iraq has a Prime Minister and an elected government in place, and the Prime Minister has announced his government's own strategy (**Attachment 3**) and a National Reconciliation Project with specific policies. (**Attachment 5**) This gives the US both a government partner to work with

and specific Iraqi strategies that the US can advance with specific US actions. Moreover, Sunnis participated in the December 2005 parliamentary elections, with the result that they are represented in the Iraqi Parliament by Sunni leaders and political parties, and there are Sunnis serving as Ministers in the Government, including a Sunni as Defense Minister.

At the time of the NSVI's publication in November 2005, Iraq was in a different situation than today: Iraq did not have a permanent Government, elected for a fixed term under a Constitution, but only an Interim Government under an administrative law that was written before Iraq had its sovereignty; and only two of Iraq's three major communities—the Shia and the Kurds—were represented in the Iraqi Parliament, in the Interim Government, and in the Parliamentary Committee that drafted the Constitution (Iraq's Sunnis had excluded themselves from the Interim Government and the Parliament by boycotting the January 2005 election).

DISCUSSION OF THE HEARING ISSUES

1. Do the strategies for victory in Iraq contain the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy?

There are six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, according to the General Accountability Office (GAO) Report 06-788, "Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve US Goals." (**Web Resource 1**) They are:

1. Clear Purpose, Scope and Methodology
2. Detailed Discussion of Problems, Risks, and Threats
3. Desired Goals, Objectives, Activities and Performance Measures
4. Description of Future Costs and Resources Needed
5. Delineation of US Government Roles and Responsibilities
6. Description of Strategy's Integration Among and With Other Entities

The GAO Report examines the NSVI to assess if these characteristics are addressed. The Report concludes the "NSVI is an improvement over previous planning efforts and does address the first three of the six desirable characteristics listed above. "

The Report finds that the NSVI "falls short in three key areas":

1. Costs: "it only partially identifies the current and future costs of US involvement in Iraq, including the costs of maintaining US military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure."

2. Responsible Agencies: "it only partially identifies which US agencies implement key aspects of the strategy or resolve conflicts among the many implementing agencies."

3. Integration: "it does not fully address how US goals and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and the international community," and

4. Iraqi Financial Contribution: "it [does not] detail the Iraqi government's anticipated contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs. (Web Resource 1)

The GAO Report also finds:

> "it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired end state in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying the US strategy."

These significant assumption changes are, according to the GAO Report:

1. Lethal Insurgency: a lethal insurgency has taken hold, and thus the assumption of a permissive security environment has changed;

2. US Funding Inadequate for Essential Services: Iraq's capacity to maintain and manage its rebuilt infrastructure is under development, and thus the assumption that US reconstruction funds would help restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels is changed; and

3. Iraqi and International Contributions of Little Help: Iraq has limited resources and its needs "vastly exceed" what has been offered by the international community, and thus the assumption that Iraq and the international community would help finance Iraq's development needs is changed.

The GAO recommends that the National Security Council, with the Departments of Defense and State, "complete the NSVI" by addressing the three characteristics the GAO finds are not addressed: 1) costs of implementing the US strategy and the resources needed, 2) clarification of US agencies roles and responsibilities, and 3) detailing potential Iraqi and international contributions to future military and reconstruction needs.

2. How important is national reconciliation to victory in Iraq?

Iraqi and US leaders, and policy experts, believe national reconciliation is fundamental to a peaceful, democratic Iraq

The first act of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki upon the completion of his Cabinet and installation of his Government, as described above, was to announce to Parliament his "National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project". (**Attachment 5**)

United States Ambassador Khalilzad ranked Iraqi national reconciliation first in his description of what needs to be accomplished in Iraq in his June 25 statement:

> "Now that Iraq has a democratically elected government in place, the time has come for unity and reconciliation." (**Attachment 4**)

Experts on Iraq at the the US Army War College and the Brookings Institution also rank national reconciliation as the top priority.

Brookings Institution Director of Middle East Policy, Dr. Kenneth Pollack, in, "A New Strategy for Iraq," describes the paramount importance of the national reconciliation issue as a "pre-condition" for progress:

> "national reconciliation and a new power-sharing arrangement is a pre-condition for any progress in Iraq..."
> (**Attachment 8**)

The US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute analyst, Dr. Stephen Biddle writes in "Foreign Affairs":

> "the only serious long-term solution to the country's communal conflict

> [is] a compromise based on a constitutional deal with iron-clad power-sharing arrangements protecting all parties." (**Web Resource 3**)

Similarly, Dr. Fareed Zakaria, who was "Foreign Affairs" Managing Editor and is today Newsweek International Chief Editor, writes:

> "all of these solutions [more military operations, more U.S. or Iraqi troops, reconstruction] are technocratic and military, while the problem in Iraq is fundamentally political. Until we recognize this, doing moreof the same will accomplish little…the reality is that only an effective political bargain will bring about order…Co-opting the majority of the Sunnis is the simplest way [Prime Minister] Maliki can cripple the insurgency." (**Attachment 12**)

In these views of the Iraqi Prime Minister, the US Ambassador, and experts, national reconciliation is the way to end the insurgency and achieve the peaceful, democratic and secure Iraq that is the NSVI definition of victory. They hold that national reconciliation needs to be achieved first. Thereafter, security will necessarily be achieved, since reconciliation will have ended the conflict.

The Camp David Fact Sheet posits the need for continued military operations, infrastructure improvements, and international support, but these do not have the potential of "ending the war" that Ambassador Khalilzad and others see in national reconciliation.

3. What are the key components of a national reconciliation strategy?

US and Iraqi leaders, and policy experts, have identified three key components of national reconciliation:

- constitutional reform, particularly an equitable distribution of oil revenues among Shia, Sunni and Kurds;
- conditional amnesty to insurgents, and
- reconsideration of de-Baathification.

Each of these components address a principal grievance of Iraq's Sunni community, where the insurgency draws its strength.

- Brookings' Dr. Pollack has written in his "A New Strategy for Iraq," "the greatest obstacle to national reconciliation is the fact that many Sunni Arabs feel alienated from the political reconstruction process." (**Attachment 8**)

- The NSVI recognizes that Sunnis are "disaffected" from the new Iraq. (**Attachment 6**)

- Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies believes rising political participation in Iraq does not signify an embrace of a democratic political process, but sharpening sectarianism: "there is a steady sharpening of sectarian divisions as Sunnis tried to make up for their decision to boycott earlier elections." (Dr. Cordesman also contends that the reports to Congress by the Departments of Defense and State are "profoundly flawed" because they provide a "fundamentally flawed picture of the political situation in Iraq" of democratic progress instead of sectarian divisions and conflict). (**Attachment 11**)

Hence, an effective national reconciliation strategy must address the grievances which have caused this Sunni alienation and disaffection and are the prime obstacle to ending the conflict in Iraq. (**Attachments 1, 6, 7, 8, 11; Web Resources 2, 3**)

<u>Constitutional reform, including how oil revenues are allocated</u>

Writing in "Foreign Affairs," Hoover Institution Senior Fellow Larry Diamond concludes:

> "Iraq's current Constitution has not been able to garner a consensus and is thus not viable." (**Web Resource 4**)

The Sunnis voted overwhelmingly against the Constitution in the October 2005 referendum, achieving a two-thirds 'no' vote in two provinces, but not the three needed to defeat the Constitution.

The Congressional Research Service's (CRS) Report for Congress, "Iraq:

Post-Saddam Governance and Security" describes the Sunni objection to the new Iraqi Constitution:

> "The crux of Sunni opposition to [the Constitution] is its provision for a weak central government ("federalism"); it allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous "regions" with their own regional governments, internal security forces, and a large role in controlling revenues from any new energy [oil and gas] discoveries." (**Web Resource 2**)

The CRS Report explains the reason for this Sunni opposition: "The Sunnis oppose this because their region, unlike those dominated by the Kurds and Shiites, lacks oil and they depend on the central government for revenues." (**Web Resource 2**)

It "would be a disastrous development for Iraq as it would likely spark civil wars both within the Shia community and between the Shia and Sunni Arabs," if the Shia and Kurdish regions keep oil revenue in their provinces and for themselves, according to Brookings' Dr. Pollack. (**Attachment 8**)

To deal with this question of fairness in oil allocations, President Bush suggested at his meetings in Baghdad on June 13 that Iraq "use its energy assets as a way to unite the country…[so that] people who may not have oil resources in their provinces would have a stake in how the resources are developed elsewhere in the country." (**Attachment 2**)

A specific proposal for oil allocation reform has been made by Brookings' Dr. Pollack, proposing that the oil revenue be distributed among several "baskets": 1) the central government for security and monetary policy, 2) an infrastructure development basket, 3) local governments based on population, 4) provinces, and 5) individual accounts for each Iraqi. (**Attachment 8**)

There is a procedure for fast-track amendment of the Iraqi Constitution. As outlined in the Congressional Research Service Report, "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security" (**Web Resource 2**), the new government is to name a constitutional revision commission within four months of its inauguration (the inauguration took place in May 2006; thus, the commission must be appointed not later than September 2006). The Parliament must approve the commission's amendments by a simple

majority. Within two months of Parliament's approval, a national referendum is to be held on the amendments.

In addition to oil distribution, some power-sharing arrangement giving the Sunnis more power than their actual numbers provide is often said to be necessary to persuade the Sunnis to end their support of the insurgency; but the type of power sharing that is sufficient to end Sunni support for the insurgency will have to be determined in negotiations. (**Web Resource 2**)

Conditional Amnesty for Insurgents

Prime Minister Maliki has proposed an amnesty for insurgents who renounce violence, support the government, and have not been involved in "terrorist acts," which he subsequently explained ruled out insurgents who have killed American or Iraqi soldiers, and Iraq police.

Ambassador Khalilzad stated that a conditional amnesty is needed "to end the war," and pointed out many wars in American history have been concluded with general or partial amnesties. Asked how he would respond to those who object that insurgents who fought Americans might be pardoned, Ambassador Khalilzad said:

> "They need to understand that we want this conflict to end… to end a war, you must balance the requirements of reconciliation with the requirements of justice." (**Attachment 4**)

US Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, who commands the program to train Iraqi Security Forces to fight the insurgency, was asked by the press on June 27 if the Prime Minister's national reconciliation plan would include amnesty for insurgents. General Dempsey replied: "Isn't there some sense of inevitability about that?" But he also noted that limits on amnesty would be drawn by US and Iraqi officials on how to best deal with insurgents who have killed American troops and Iraqis. (**Attachment 9**)

Charles Krauthammer writes, in his nationally syndicated column of June 30, 2006, titled "Amnesty for Insurgents? Yes:"

> "Amnesty will be an essential element in any reconciliation policy. Which, in turn, is the only route to victory… Our objective in any war is not revenge but success. Confederate soldiers who swore allegiance

> to the United States were pardoned after the Civil War…We gave amnesty to legions of Japanese and Germans who'd killed thousands of Americans in World War II.
>
> The posturing over amnesty can only make [success and victory] more difficult." (**Attachment 13**)

Others contend that amnesty for those who have killed Americans would be wrong, and would be an affront to the memory of Americans who gave their lives to liberate Iraq and defeat the insurgency.

Reconsideration of de-Baathification

Another Sunni grievance is the broad scale of de-Baathification.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and whose CPA Order No. 1 banned Baath senior officials from public office has written:

> "…our policy was intended to affect only the top 1 percent or so of party members. The error was that I left the implementation of the policy to a political body within the nascent Iraqi government, where it became a tool of politicians, who applied it much more broadly than we had intended ." (**Attachment 10**).

The result was that many Sunnis were removed from their jobs as teachers, civil servants and other professionals due to their nominal party membership, which was a condition of employment by the Saddam regime.

It is against this background that Ambassador Khalilzad said, "I urge the [Iraqi Parliament] to move on the reconsideration of the de-Baathification Commission." (**Attachment 6**)

General Dempsey, in his recent Pentagon press briefing, addressed a related Sunni grievance, which is the loss of jobs by Sunnis due to the abolition of the Iraqi Army. General Dempsey described the recent opportunity given to some 2,500 former Iraqi Army officers to be trained for positions in the new Army. Approximately 1,500 completed the training and have joined the new Army. (**Web Resource 5**)

WITNESS TESTIMONY

Witnesses were told the purpose of the hearing is to examine the evolution of US strategy for Iraq comparing the November 2005 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" to the White House June 13, 2006 Fact Sheet to assess if these plans address the characteristics of an effective national strategy.

GAO Comptroller General David Walker will release GAO Report 06-788, "Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve US Goals," and testify on the Report's findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Ambassador James Jeffrey, the Secretary of State's Senior Advisor on Iraq and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East will testify on the current initiatives announced at the June 12 Camp David meeting, and their implementation, including US policy on the Iraqi Government's national reconciliation project.

The Department of Defense representative will testify on the security components of the US strategy for Iraq.

Dr. Kenneth Pollack, Brookings Institution Middle East Policy Director and author of "Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq," will testify on security strategy and on his proposals for how oil revenues should be allocated to achieve national reconciliation.

Dr. Leith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy Senior Director for Middle East and North Africa, and former spokesman for the Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister, will testify on the positions of the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish leaders on constitutional reform.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Affairs (CSIS), Admiral Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy and author of "Winning the "Long War" in Iraq: What the US Can and Cannot Do," will testify on his view that the political situation in Iraq reflects sectarian divisions, not acceptance of democracy and that this is not adequately taken into account in the Department of Defense and the Department of State reports to Congress.

Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Specialist in Middle East Affairs, and author of "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security" will testify on the issues involved in national reconciliation.

ATTACHMENTS

1. National Security Council, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq." November 2005.

2. "White House Fact Sheet: Camp David Meetings: Building on Progress in Iraq," June 13, 2006.

3. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, "Our Strategy for a Democratic Iraq," The Washington Post, June 9, 2006.

4. Transcript of Press Conference of the President, June 14, 2006.

5. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, "Announcement and Text of the National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project presented to the Parliament of Iraq," June 25, 2006.

6. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, "Statement on Iraq's National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project," June 25, 2006.

7. David Ignatius, "A Road Map Home: From Khalilzad, Realism on the Iraqi Insurgency," The Washington Post, June 28, 2006.

8. Kenneth Pollack, "A Switch in Time, A New Strategy for America in Iraq," Brookings Institute, February, 2006.

9. Thom Shanker, "US General Says Iraqi Army Will Be Built by End of the Year," New York Times, June 28, 2006.

10. Paul Bremer, "In Iraq, Wrongs Made a Right," New York Times, January 13, 2006.

11. Dr. Anthony Cordesman, "Give the Defense Department an F", Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2006.

12. Fareed Zakaria, "What we Need to Get Right," Newsweek, June 5, 2006.

13. Charles Krauthammer, "Amnesty for Insurgents? Yes" Washington Post, June 30, 2006

WEB RESOURCES

1. GAO Report -06-788, "Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve US Goals" (July 11, 2006)

2. Congressional Research Service, Report No. RL31339, "Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security," Updated June 14, 2006. http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/html/RL31339.html

3. Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006) http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85201/stephen-biddle/seeing-baghdad-thinking-saigon.html

4. Diamond, Dobbins, Gelb and Kaufmann, "Iraq: A Roundtable," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006) http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faresponse85412/larry-diamond-james-dobbins-chaim-kaufmann-leslie-h-gelb-stephen-biddle/what-to-do-in-iraq-a-roundtable.html

5. Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, DoD News Briefing, June 27, 2006 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060627-13349.html

WITNESSES

Panel I

The Honorable David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States

accompanied by:

Joseph Christoff
Director of International Affairs
General Accountability Office

Ambassador James Jeffrey
Senior Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State and
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East
Department of State

Representative
Department of Defense

Panel II

Dr. Anthony Cordesman
Admiral Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Affairs (CSIS)

Dr. Kenneth Pollack
Director of Middle Eastern Policy
Brookings Institution

Dr. Leith Kubba
Senior Director for Middle East and North Africa
National Endowment for Democracy

Dr. Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Congressional Research Service