

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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August 18, 2004

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

From: Thomas Costa, Professional Staff

Re: Briefing memo for the hearing *The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Defending Ideals and Defining the Message* scheduled for Monday, August 23, 2004 at 1:00 p.m. in room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The purpose of the hearing is to examine U.S. government efforts to conduct public diplomacy in the Middle East and to determine the status of efforts to adapt public diplomacy to the post 9/11 world.

HEARING ISSUES

- 1. How can the U.S. communicate effectively with Middle East audiences?**
- 2. To what extent are U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East coordinated?**

BACKGROUND

For many years, aspects of U.S. Middle East policy have been criticized as being tone deaf to local concerns. Critics claim the U.S. neither listens to nor understands what is being said about America in the Middle East region. While U.S. public diplomacy programs have not always succeeded in conveying America's message to the elites of the region, critics say they have been especially ineffectual in addressing the ordinary citizens of the Muslim Middle East, those people whose popular sentiment and opinions mass to form the so-called "Arab Street." "The United States government," says one study on public diplomacy, "is losing its voice before foreign audiences and needs to get it back." (**Web Resource 1**)

Following the events of September 11, the need for strengthening public diplomacy became that much greater as the Administration strove to make Muslim publics in the Middle East, and elsewhere, aware that America's war on terrorism is not a war on Islam. The war in Iraq has exacerbated our public diplomacy challenges in the region.

9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission report calls for "short-term action on a long-range strategy, one that invigorates our foreign policy with the attention that the President and Congress have given to the military and intelligence parts of the conflict against Islamist terrorism." (**Web Resource 2**)

The Commission notes the US must engage in the struggle of ideas, making three recommendations:

The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors.... To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage – we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future.... (**Web Resource 2**)

Second:

Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future....” (**Web Resource 2**)

And last, the Commission recommends:

Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.

- Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.
- The United States should rebuild the scholarships, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States. (**Web Resource 2**)

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is defined as “the cultural, educational, and information programs, citizen exchanges, or broadcasts used to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences.” (**Web Resource 3**)

One of the Administration responses to growing resentment in the Arab world includes reemphasizing and reinvigorating public diplomacy efforts. In 2002, “(I)n the National Security Strategy of the United States, President George W. Bush recognized the importance of adapting public diplomacy to meet the post-September 11 challenge: ‘Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim

world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel.”
(Web Resource 4)

The House recognized the need to increase and improve understanding of the U.S. among overseas audiences and change attitudes. The Freedom Support Act of 2002 (H.R. 3969), adopted by House vote on 9/22/02, was a comprehensive attempt to restructure and refinance public diplomacy and rationalize the diverse elements making up U.S. international broadcasting. It would have, for example, amended the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to make public diplomacy an integral element in the planning and execution of U.S. foreign policy. **(Web Resource 1)** The bill was not considered by the Senate. Similar provisions are included in H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which is also awaiting consideration.

Department of State

Following the consolidation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State on October 1, 1999, the delivery of America’s message overseas fell to the State Department. **(Web Resource 5)** Today, the Department of State remains the primary advocate of public diplomacy efforts. However, agencies such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and others are also involved in delivering the U.S. message abroad.

Charlotte Beers, a former chairwoman of two of the world’s top ten advertising agencies, became Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in October 2001. During her tenure, which began just three weeks after 9/11, there was a rapid growth in public diplomacy directed toward the Middle East and the entire Muslim world. The tools employed included: overseas speaker programs, digital video conferences (DVCs), a website, and publications designed to address the perception that Muslims were not treated equally in the U.S., and portraying them as leading culturally, economically, and religiously fulfilling lives in a tolerant U.S. While these programs supported the President’s message that America’s struggle was with terrorists, not with Islam, they also engendered criticism from some who took issue with an official focus on Islam in America, a nation where there is supposed to be clear separation of church and state.

Controversy swirled around Under Secretary Beers, who resigned in March 2003 for personal reasons, when her “Shared Values” initiative employed techniques of the advertising world in public diplomacy (TV spots showing Muslim Americans leading productive daily lives in an open, tolerant America). However, the *Changing Minds, Winning Peace* study on U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world found the campaign to be well-conceived and based on solid audience research, although the production of the finished product took too long and was too expensive. **(Web Resource 4)**

State uses the full array of public diplomacy tools in the Arab and Muslim world, including a variety of educational and professional exchange programs and the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) website, <http://usinfo.state.gov>. During the Iraq war, the site carried an Iraqi Update Site, the Iraqi Human Rights Report, and a link to Radio Free Iraq. **(Web Resource 6)**

In March 2004, in consultation with the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Department of State public diplomacy strategy was updated, highlighting four public diplomacy strategic priorities:

- The Arab and Muslim world;
- Non-elite, non-traditional audiences, especially the young;
- New initiatives, thinking outside the box;
- Strategic direction and performance measurement.

(Attachment 1)

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is also engaged in public diplomacy activities, primarily through its involvement in media development. Media development efforts comprise technical and journalism training, the fostering of reform of media laws and regulations, and the capitalizing of media. Media development work takes place in those countries where U.S. democracy and governance activities make up an important element in the work of USAID.

In the wake of 9/11, the White House also created the Office of Global Communications. The office is intended to be an Executive Branch coordinating body to work with the State Department and according to then-White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, “for America to get its message out to other countries, answering the questions about why do other nations have thoughts about America

in a way that is totally unreflective of the way Americans think of our nation.”
(**Web Resource 7**)

Broadcasting Board of Governors

All U.S. government and government-sponsored – but non-military – international broadcasting is overseen by the bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Among the broadcasting services falling under the oversight of BBG are the Voice of America, Persian-language Radio Farda, and Arabic-language Radio Sawa. Radio Sawa is a 24/7 Arabic-language radio station geared toward young listeners throughout the Middle East. It broadcasts a mix of Western and Arabic pop music plus the latest news, news analysis, opinion pieces, interviews, features, and sports. (**Attachment 2**) While BBG points to a poll showing 42% of young people who listen to pop music preferred Radio Sawa, critics say that Sawa’s audience listens to the music but not to the news and opinion pieces designed to both inform and change the negative attitudes of listeners. (**Web Resource 8**)

Al-Hurra, also known as the Middle East Television Network (METN), a multi-million dollar BBG initiative – with \$30 million of U.S. government startup money – began broadcasting in February 2004 in order to take on Al-Jazeera and other regionally-based, Arabic-language satellite television stations. The METN schedule will include everything from morning talk and evening news shows to a variety of acquired programming (American shows and movies). (**Web Resource 8**)

Public Diplomacy Studies and Reports

During the past few years, several significant studies have been issued dealing with the conduct of U.S. public diplomacy in the post-9/11 era. The reports call for new initiatives and approaches to public diplomacy and greater coordination among those agencies responsible for explaining and advocating U.S. policies and values to foreign publics.

The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy is a bipartisan, congressionally-created, presidentially-appointed panel providing oversight of U.S. government public diplomacy activities. In September 2002, the Commission released *Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources*. The report emphasized the need for restructuring, and enhancing the

resources devoted to, public diplomacy. The Commission recommended greater coordination among U.S. governmental entities carrying out public diplomacy, as well as an assessment of America's public diplomacy readiness worldwide combined with strategically focused funding. **(Web Resource 3)**

The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, affiliated with the Advisory Commission, issued its report on October 1, 2003. *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World* called for a new architecture for public diplomacy beginning at the White House, with the State Department being the lead agency in public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, the Advisory Group noted, should involve long-term thinking and should be involved in policy formulation from the outset. The report emphasized the need for measurement and evaluation designed to determine success in influencing people's views and attitudes. The Advisory Group called for greater private sector involvement in public diplomacy. **(Web Resource 4)**

The Advisory Group recommends the creation of a Cabinet-level position of Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy in order to improve coordination of U.S. public diplomacy activities. The Special Counselor, in consultation with the President, would establish strategic goals and messages, oversee the implementation focusing on these goals, and ensure effective measurement and evaluation of these goals. The Special Counselor would participate in policy formulation within the National Security Council and preside over another recommended new entity, the President's Public Diplomacy Experts' Board. That Board would be made up of 16 outside-of-government distinguished citizens with relevant expertise plus the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as ex-officio members. **(Web Resource 4)**

The Advisory Group recommends a presidential letter of instruction to embassy Chiefs of Mission that would "emphasize the critical importance of public diplomacy to national security and to highlight the expectation that Chiefs of Mission will personally participate in public diplomacy activities and ensure that members of their staffs do likewise." The Advisory Group also calls for an Arab and Muslim Countries Communication Unit which, under the direction of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, would provide: daily coordination of U. S. government media outreach to Arab and Muslim nations; and

“rapid response” ability regarding information dissemination and the countering of foreign media inaccuracies. **(Web Resource 4)**

In September 2003, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published its study of public diplomacy as practiced by the State Department. The findings in the study *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges* included:

- Following 9/11, State funding for public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East rose by more than half;
- The Department of State was only in the developmental stage of creating a strategy that would coordinate and integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and direct them toward common goals;
- State had failed to develop performance measures to gauge attitudinal change toward the U.S. among foreign publics. **(Web Resource 9)**

In June 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published *Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S Public Diplomacy*, a report put together by an independent task force. The CFR task force said one important reason for the lack of effectiveness of the U.S. response arises from treating public diplomacy as an afterthought in the policy formulation process. The study spoke of U.S. government underutilization of the private sector, noting the private sector lead in “the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications.” **(Web Resource 6)**

The Council on Foreign Relations public diplomacy task force also stressed the need for the involvement of the President in public diplomacy as the first step toward improved coordination of U.S. public diplomacy. The Council called for a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on public diplomacy. The PDD should include:

- A clear strategy and policy designed to strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to communicate with foreign publics;
- Provide a strong coordinating structure for the government’s civilian and military public diplomacy assets;

- The effects of policy options on foreign public opinion should be taken into consideration by all regional and functional NSC Policy Coordinating Committees;
- A schedule of tasks and benchmarks for evaluation of progress toward the achievement of public diplomacy reforms.

CFR also suggested beginning a Quadrennial Public Diplomacy Review, similar to the existing Quadrennial Defense Review, that would establish a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness and spending priorities. **(Web Resource 6)**

The Heritage Foundation issued a report, *How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy*, in April 2003. The report underscored the need for recognition of public diplomacy by policymakers as “a strategic, long-term effort that requires consistent application.” The Foundation report called for a restoration of public diplomacy’s pre-consolidation independent reporting and budget channels within the Department of State, “so that public diplomacy officers may conduct their overseas mission without begging for table scraps from a bureaucracy that hardly understands it.” **(Web Resource 1)**

This hearing follows up on two previous Subcommittee hearings, “Are We Listening to the Arab Street?” held on October 8, 2002 and “Public Diplomacy in the Middle East” held on February 5, 2004.

DISCUSSION

1. How can the U.S. communicate effectively with Middle East audiences?

As the 9/11 Commission commented, “the United States has to help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people....” **(Web Resource 2)**

Some Middle East experts question the ultimate value of the heightened U.S. public diplomacy effort, citing evidence that reliance on public diplomacy will never address the underlying problems and pierce the mistrust on the street. Instead, they call for enhanced listening by the U.S., rather than the one-way communication that has been the norm. They claim our message is not understood because we do not understand our audience. We rely far too much on logical arguments, which in the Arab world can be perceived as deception. Instead, the

U.S. needs to reassess government policies so they better reflect American ideals of justice, liberty, freedom, human rights, and fairness to an Arab audience. (**Web Resource 10**)

Middle East experts point to the U.S. failure to take into account the cultural divide in our Middle Eastern public diplomacy. The results of the June 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project underscore the challenges for U.S. public diplomacy posed by the communications cultural divide. In the wake of the Iraq war, majorities in 7 of 8 Muslim nations expressed worries the U.S. might become a military threat to their nations. Solid majorities in several predominantly Muslim countries say they have at least some confidence in Osama bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” And, 71% of Palestinians say they have confidence in bin Laden doing the right thing regarding world affairs. (**Web Resource 11 and Attachment 3**)

U.S. public diplomacy, say the experts, mirrors an American cultural communication style, relying on the mass media, print and broadcast, to get our message out. Authorities on the Middle East point out that there is wide distrust of the Arab mass media in the region and, in the Arab world, face-to-face meetings are the most effective means of communication. Consequently, while BBG and others have great hopes for METN, others suggest that U.S. government ties – through BBG – will undermine its credibility in the region. (**Web Resource 12**)

In addition, whereas the U.S. focuses on one-way messages designed to inform and/or convince, Arab culture tends to connect people through “two-way, relationshipbuilding strategies.” While “the facts speak for themselves” for Americans, metaphors, analogies, and rhetorical questions are, for Arabs, the most effective persuasive devices. Americans value straightforwardness but Middle Easterners perceive directness in a public setting as “confrontational.” Conversely, new initiatives were often criticized as too slick – much like an American commercial – and therefore not credible. (**Web Resource 12**)

In public diplomacy efforts designed to counter the perception the war on terrorism was a war on Islam, we pointed to U.S. assistance to Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. However, say experts on the region, most Muslims frown upon highlighting one’s charitable giving or good deeds. (**Web Resource 12**)

Although our communication style and our Middle East policies may not resonate with Muslim audiences, opinion studies show there is a mystique surrounding American culture and democratic values and the American economy. The Council on Foreign Relations public diplomacy study suggests promotion of a better understanding of U.S. policies could be improved by finding:

ways to tie... [policies] more closely to American cultural values, including the nation's democratic traditions and extraordinary capacity for self-criticism and self-correction. Values that should be highlighted include strength of family, religious faith, expansive social safety nets, volunteerism, freedom of expression, the universal reach of education and its practical consequences in economic prosperity, and America's achievements in science and medicine. **(Web Resource 6)**

The importance of shared values in public diplomacy was noted in other reports. The face-to-face discussion of shared values and of divisive issues is often impossible due to the current emphasis on security over engagement, with our public diplomacy officers residing in protected fortresses, far from their natural audiences.

The Advisory Group *Changing Minds, Winning Peace* study suggests increasing the number of multi-functional "American Corners" programming facilities – housed in libraries, universities, chambers of commerce, etc. – to partially address U.S. diplomacy's self-imposed isolation. According to the same study, American Studies organizations, university programs and courses, and centers are strikingly absent – and needed – in the Middle East. The authors of the study believe American Studies Centers should be created in the region through a collaborative effort of the U.S. government, the private sector, and local universities. For example, the American Studies center at Cairo University, being a local initiative, enjoys credibility among scholars and students. **(Web Resource 4)**

The *Arab Human Development Report*, a July 2002 United Nations study written by Arabs for Arabs, highlighted Arab isolation from the world of ideas and the fact that about a fourth of all Arabs are illiterate (two-thirds of them are women). **(Web Resource 13)** The findings of the U.N. study underscore the importance of increased funding for traditional, bedrock public diplomacy programs such as educational, professional, and cultural exchange programs and English teaching programs, as called for by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, The Heritage Foundation, and the 9/11 Commission.

2. To what extent are U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East coordinated?

In October 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked

Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us? Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions. (**Web Resources 2**)

It may be telling it was the Secretary of Defense and not a State Department official who expressed this type of forward thinking. The position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is currently filled by an “acting” Under Secretary, and the position has been without consistent leadership for 12 of the 35 months since 9/11. In the absence of leadership from the Department of State, public diplomacy has been in an unacceptable state of flux, with different agencies filling the policy void, often without adequate government-wide coordination.

The 9/11 Commission notes a need to “define what the message is, what it stands for.” The State Department needs to take the lead and begin that process, incorporating the views of other agencies such as DoD, USAID, and BBG. (**Web Resource 2**)

The major studies of public diplomacy call for greater coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts carried out by such organizations as the Department of State, BBG, DoD, and USAID. Some see a need for a new organizational architecture for public diplomacy.

While the State Department is seen as the lead agency for public diplomacy, it has only some authority over USAID and BBG and no authority over DoD public diplomacy activities. Furthermore, the White House Office of Global Communications appears to have atrophied. The problems arising from a lack of coordination and strategic direction can be seen in Iraq. A lack of consistent

leadership, allowed DoD, or more accurately the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), to take over public diplomacy efforts.

Challenges arose as information work changed from psyops-directed information activities during combat operations to development of a free and independent media for an independent, democratic Iraq. USAID and State have long experience in media development, including providing technical and journalism training, development of fair regulatory authorities, capitalization of nascent media outlets, etc. However, the establishment of the Iraq Media Network (IMN) fell to CPA, who awarded a contract to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), an organization with little experience in establishing independent media but a contractual history with DoD in such areas as psychological operations. In addition, having DoD in charge, an institution many Iraqis distrusted, may have further undermined public diplomacy efforts. This distrust was likely exacerbated by the shutting down of certain media outlets by CPA. The U.S. should have had the capacity to rebut erroneous media comments.

At the same time as DoD began to develop IMN, BBG had begun METN. METN broadcasts by satellite to the Middle East, including to Iraq via a terrestrial broadcast operation. It is unclear what level of coordination existed between CPA and BBG and how much duplication there was with the two TV outlets.

This sort of disjunction in public diplomacy activities, often leading to inefficiencies and diminished effectiveness, could be improved through implementation of some of the previously outlined recommendations of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World and the Council on Foreign Relations. For example, the Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy would have, in theory, the authority to coordinate public diplomacy resources. Participating in policy formulation within the NSC, he or she could address potential problems at an earlier stage of development.

As challenging as a major overhaul of America's public diplomacy structure might be, one thing is certain: we cannot ignore the importance of the struggle for the hearts and minds of overseas publics. As the Advisory Group was told in Morocco, "If you do not define yourself in this part of the world, the extremists will define you."

WITNESSES

Witnesses were asked to discuss the lack of a comprehensive assessment of what the goals of U.S. public diplomacy are, what the message of U.S. public diplomacy is, short-term and long-term goals for public diplomacy, how that message will be delivered, and with limited resources, to what extent and where that message will be delivered.

Witnesses were further asked for their comments about the successes achieved by, and the challenges facing, U.S. public diplomacy efforts. In particular, those comments relating to the public diplomacy recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, as well as any efforts underway to better articulate a public diplomacy message, coordinate U.S. public diplomacy efforts across the government, and measure tangible accomplishments.

TBD 9/11 Commission Members are expected to discuss the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission regarding public diplomacy efforts abroad.

Patricia De Stacy Harrison, Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is expected to discuss State Department public diplomacy activities in the Middle East and new ideas for improvement and measurement of effectiveness.

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), is expected to discuss current BBG radio and TV broadcasting in the region and the new Middle East Television Network, Al-Hurra. He is also expected to discuss the 9/11 Commission recommendation to increase funding for BBG efforts and ask for about \$75 million to expand broadcasting to Arab and Muslim publics across the globe.

Charles “Tre” Evers III, a member of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and President of Consensus Communications, is expected to discuss the public diplomacy findings and recommendations contained in studies produced by the Commission and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.

Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office, is expected to address the conclusions and

recommendations contained in GAO reports on State Department-conducted public diplomacy and U.S. international broadcasting.

Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action and Chairman of DDB Worldwide, is expected to discuss the efforts of Business for Diplomatic Action to enlist the business community to reduce anti-Americanism.

Charlotte Beers, former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is expected to discuss her views on the status of US public diplomacy and her efforts to bring new approaches to public diplomacy.

Dr. Rhonda S. Zaharna, Associate Professor of Public Communications at American University, is expected to address the failure of U.S. efforts to reach Arab and Muslim publics.

Hafez Al-Mirazi, Bureau Chief of Al Jazeera's Washington office and a former Voice of America and BBC reporter, is expected to testify about the nature of U.S. public diplomacy and Al Jazeera's role as a television station.

***The 9/11 Commission Recommendations on
Public Diplomacy:
Defending Ideals and Defining the Message***
Monday, August 23, 2004, 1:00 p.m., room 2154 RHOB

WITNESS LIST

PANEL ONE

TBD 9/11 Commission Member or Staff

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(The 9/11 Commission)

TBD 9/11 Commission Member or Staff

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(The 9/11 Commission)

PANEL TWO

Patricia de Stacy Harrison

Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Department of State

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson

Chairman
Broadcasting Board of Governors

Charles “Tre” Evers III

Commissioner
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Government Accountability Office

PANEL THREE

Keith Reinhard

President, Business for Diplomatic Action
Chariman, DDB Worldwide

Accompanied by: **Gary Knell**
President & CEO, Sesame Workshop

Charlotte Beers

Former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Department of State

Dr. Rhonda S. Zaharna

Associate Professor of Public Communication
American University

Hafez Al-Mirazi

Bureau Chief
Al Jazeera Washington Office

ATTACHMENTS

1. United States Department of State Public Diplomacy Strategy (Update), March 1, 2004.
2. “Radio Sawa,” Broadcasting Board of Governors website printout.
3. James Kitfield, “Muddling the Message,” National Journal, October 11, 2003.

WEB RESOURCES

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9. “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges,” General Accounting Office, September 2003.
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12. R.S. Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, June 2003.
<http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306comm.html>
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<http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/englishpresskit2003.html>